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 DOMESTIC BARGAINING IN TAIWAN'S
 INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
 NEGOTIATIONS
 _ Chien-pin Li
 Development literature often depicts development as a
 transitional process in which agriculture is marginalized while resources are
 transferred to growing nonfarm sectors, through either voluntary exchange or
 involuntary coercion. The conventional analysis of Taiwan's agriculture and
 its role in economic development generally attests to this model.-1 Prior to the
 1970s, as the backbone of Taiwan's economy and the major earner of foreign
 currencies, agriculture accounted for more than 40% of the total employment
 and over 20% of the net domestic product (NDP). But a series of programs
 unfavorable to farmers were put in place so that the government could chan-
 nel resources into industrial development. For instance, rice farmers were
 asked to pay for fertilizer with rice at exchange ratios consistently unfavor-
 able to them, and the government's mandatory purchase scheme bought rice
 from farmers at 20% to 30% below prevailing market prices. Through these
 mechanisms, productivity gains achieved after Taiwan's land reforms (1949-
 53) were taken by the government, which subsequently redirected them into
 the emerging industrial sector as investment capital. In addition, the abun-
 dant supply of food and labor from rural areas also provided an environment
 conducive to low-wage, labor-intensive industrialization. As a consequence,
 Chien-pin Li is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Sci-
 ence and International Affairs, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia. The author is
 grateful for research support from the Pacific Cultural Foundation. An earlier version of the
 paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association/West, Univer-
 sity of California, Davis, October 1997.
 ? 1998 by The Regents of the University of California
 1. For a review of the role of agriculture in development studies, see Robert H. Bates, "Agrar-
 ian Politics," in Understanding Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Hunt-
 ington (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman/Little Brown, 1987), pp. 160-95. For the discussion on
 Taiwan, see Teng-hui Lee, Intersectoral Capital Flow in the Economic Development of Taiwan:
 1895-1960 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). Also, see Samuel P. S. Ho, Eco-
 nomic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).
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 resources "squeezed" from agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s have laid the
 foundation for Taiwan's economic expansion and industrial development.
 Adverse effects of heavy taxation on agriculture began to show up in the
 1960s, as the nonfarm sector accelerated its growth and overtook agriculture
 in both NDP and total exports. By the early 1970s, Taiwan's agricultural
 policy was due for a change. This was in part because of concern for food
 security as Taiwan's rice production fell to a 10-year low amid a worldwide
 grain shortage, and in part because of the demand for legitimacy as Chiang
 Ching-kuo, the oldest son of Chiang Kai-shek, was preparing to take over.
 As shown in the Program for Accelerating Rural Development (1972) and the
 Statute of Agricultural Development (1973), those policies and programs that
 were most detrimental to farmers were abolished. Agricultural policy was
 reoriented from taxation to protection and subsidization. The Rice-for-Ferti-
 lizer program was replaced by a Food Stabilization Fund (1974), which, in its
 first three years, purchased rice at 20% above production cost. Furthermore,
 guaranteed prices for domestic production and such protective measures as
 import licensing and restrictions were adopted to support the agricultural sec-
 tor.
 However, since the mid-1980s, these state intervention and support pro-
 grams have faced increasing challenges. The first wave of pressures came
 from the U.S. government, which asked Taiwan to lower tariff and nontariff
 barriers for agriculture and services both to fulfill the latter's obligations
 under the 1978 U.S.-Taiwan Trade Agreement and, more importantly, to re-
 duce its trade surplus. Topics such as Taiwan's rice subsidy and exports as
 well as trade barriers for wine, cigarettes, fruit, beef, and turkeys have been
 high-priority issues on the U.S. agenda throughout the 1980s. Persistent ef-
 forts and pressures from the U.S. gradually decreased tariff rates and import
 controls on many items; as a result, Taiwan's agricultural imports more than
 doubled by the end of the 1980s.2 Liberalization pressures and the influx of
 imports have definitely had an impact on Taiwan's farmers.
 In an attempt to seek extended international recognition and counterbal-
 ance U.S. trade pressures through a multilateral framework, Taiwan in 1990
 applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
 predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Once again the agri-
 cultural sector became a focal point, this time in the accession negotiations.
 Such issues as market access, production subsidies, and other agricultural
 programs have come under close scrutiny from member states. For example,
 the U.S. put forth a list of 8,000 items for tariff reduction and demanded that
 average agricultural duties be kept below 20%. These requests became an
 2. The averaged yearly agricultural imports were $1.9 billion in 1975-79 and soared to $4.7
 billion in 1985-89.
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 important reference point for other member states in their negotiations. It is
 quite clear that Taiwan's agricultural sector will undergo further adjustments
 and changes in the years to come. By one estimate, local farm and livestock
 industries could lose up to US$1.2 billion in the first year after joining the
 WTO.3
 Given Taiwan's relatively isolated diplomatic position, it has had very lit-
 tle room to maneuver vis-at-vis the U.S. and other WTO members. Generally,
 it has had to concede to pressures for cutbacks of agricultural protection and
 support programs. How do Taiwan's farmers react to decisions that undercut
 their welfare? What do they do to protect their own interests? These ques-
 tions are especially interesting and relevant in light of the new trends of
 democratization and political reforms that have come about since Taiwan's
 lifting of martial law in July 1987. They have set farmers free to pursue more
 forceful and assertive campaigns in articulating and advocating their inter-
 ests. How does the Taiwanese government respond to this anger and frustra-
 tion being expressed by rural constituents? What might be their options and
 strategies in domestic bargaining? To answer these questions, this article will
 examine the internal bargaining process between the government and its agri-
 cultural sector, and analyze their strategies and interactions.
 Historical Background
 Prior to the lifting of martial law, most farmers in Taiwan belonged to one of
 the 300-plus farmers' associations. These were organized in tiers parallel to
 the government' s administrative structures, from township- to province-
 levels. The daily operations of each association were in the hands of a chief
 executive, called the general manager. Farmers' representatives elected a
 board of directors, who in turn chose the general manager from one to two
 candidates recommended by the government. Official appointments for gen-
 eral managers came from the Taiwan Provincial Government-the highest
 administrative authority for the associations-with the power to issue direc-
 tives and allocate funds.
 Apparently, this structural arrangement reflected the quasi-governmental
 function of farmers' associations under Taiwan's martial law regime. It re-
 sembled what has been characterized as a corporatist structure, that is, a sys-
 tem of hierarchical, noncompetitive interest representations sanctioned and
 mediated by the state.4 Interest groups functioned like transmitters or auxil-
 iaries of political communication, resource mobilization, and policy imple-
 3. See the electronic version of the Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, available at <http://
 www.roc-taiwan.org/info/yearbook/flhtml/chl2_9.html#chl2_0>.
 4. For the corporatist nature of interest groups in Taiwan, see Hung-mao Tien, The Great
 Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford: Hoover Institution
 Press, Stanford University, 1989), pp. 43-45.
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 mentation for the ruling regime. In exchange, farmers' associations were
 granted limited roles in interest articulation and policy formation.
 The structure was further upheld by the depth of its penetration by the
 ruling party, Kuomintang (KMT). Although less than 10% of the ordinary
 and associate members of the farmers' associations had joined the KMT,
 KMT members controlled most of the leadership positions such as seats on
 the boards of directors and general managers. Percentages ranged from over
 80% at the local level to 100% at the provincial level.5 During elections, the
 KMT relied on leaders in the farmers' associations to campaign for the
 party's candidates through grassroots mobilization; in turn, the KMT re-
 warded these loyal campaigners with political opportunities and economic
 resources.
 On paper, farmers' associations had lofty economic missions such as pro-
 tecting farmers' interests, enhancing their standards of living, and developing
 the rural economy. However, their economic functions were quite limited,
 since many of the parameters governing production, pricing, and marketing
 were set by governmental agencies or state enterprises. For instance, in the
 1950s and 1960s, supply and distribution of fertilizers were monopolized by
 Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation, a state enterprise. Fertilizers were set at such
 high prices that Taiwanese farmers had to pay 50% more for fertilizers than
 their Japanese counterparts.6 With the help of mandatory purchasing and
 Rice-for-Fertilizer programs, the Taiwan Provincial Food Bureau established
 control over a sizable stock of rice, which gave it strong influence over the
 rice market. The government thus was able to manipulate rice farmers' pro-
 duction costs and profits. With respect to sugarcane and fruit farmers, pro-
 duction, shipping, and marketing of their products are regulated by contracts
 with the government-owned Taiwan Sugar Corporation and Taiwan Vegeta-
 bles and Fruits Cooperative, respectively. Consequently, agricultural markets
 were dominated and distorted by government intervention. There was little
 the farmers' associations could do to promote their members' economic wel-
 fare.
 Ironically, farmers' associations in Taiwan had become important in ways
 that, in effect, undercut their original purposes. With their mission to attract
 savings from farmers and their authority to decide on agricultural loans, these
 associations were in the enviable position of controlling a large amount of
 financial assets and credits. This made them important actors in local econo-
 mies and politics. Politicians with ambitions and agenda beyond the confines
 of local agricultural interests frequently joined the associations and sought
 5. Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 59-63.
 6. See Hsiao Kuo-ho, Taiwan nongye xingshuai sishi nian [The forty-year rise and fall of
 Taiwanese agriculture] (Taipei: Zili wanbao she, 1987), p. 86.
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 leadership positions as a means to advance their own careers with the
 networking and resource advantages these organizations provided. As these
 associations turned into resource centers for local elites, competition for posi-
 tions became so fierce that fraud and irregularities were not uncommon in
 elections.7 Local factionalism frequently became the cause and effect of
 these intensified competitions. The KMT practiced a "divide-and-conquer"
 strategy by playing the factions off against each other. Amid the political
 strife and entanglements, the original functions and purposes of the farmers'
 associations were distorted or lost. They became arenas for politicians rather
 than continuing to serve as advocates for local farmers.
 The KMT's land reform policies introduced an additional stabilizing ele-
 ment in rural Taiwan that complemented its strong grip on farmers. Pro-
 grams like Compulsory Rent Reduction (1949), Sale of Public Lands (1951),
 and Land-to-Tiller program (1953) freed numerous farmers from tenancy and
 granted them farmlands. Owner-cultivator households grew from 36% in
 1949 to 55% in 1953. Ultimately, the wealthy, well-educated, landed gentry
 lost its economic and political power, while the beneficiaries, tenants, and
 owner-cultivators emerged as the new rural leaders. In appreciation for the
 reform policy, a majority of farmers provided solid political support for the
 government and the KMT.
 Furthermore, the economic structure of the small family farm system that
 developed after land reforms contributed to growing conservatism in rural
 areas. A comparative study that included Taiwan as a case indicated that
 self-employed small family farmers tend to favor the status quo.8 Family
 farms act as independent, self-contained economic units. Members often re-
 act to market fluctuations and economic hardship through self-adjustment or
 self-exploitation. They tend to lower their own expectations or standards of
 living rather than organize political movements to change the external envi-
 ronment. The economic independence of each farming family reduced the
 need for cooperation or coordination between families, and hence resulted in
 less opportunities for community organization. In their economic undertak-
 ings, family farmers interacted more with such nonfarmers as government
 officials or intermediaries for services rather than with other farmers. This
 economic independence further contributed to their political isolation and ap-
 athy.
 7. Ibid., p. 55. The problem continues today. According to a recent survey, over 60% of
 farmers interviewed report briberies and other irregularities in the elections, and close to 50% of
 them mention the existence of violence in those elections. See Liu Chin-yung, "Taiwan
 nonghuei xuanju zhi yanjiu, H" [A study on the elections of the Taiwan farmers' associations,
 II], Taiwan jingji [Taiwan economy], no. 196 (1993), p. 44.
 8. Jeffrey M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: Free Press, 1975).
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 In a survey of Taiwanese farmers' political attitudes, approximately 80%
 of the respondents said that there was nothing they could do if they were not
 satisfied with the agricultural policy; only 13% said that they would take it up
 with their legislative representative.9 The survey showed that this kind of
 passive, conservative attitude was quite common in rural areas. The combi-
 nation of political control by the KMT and the conservative culture of small
 family farmers explained why farmers had been politically passive and sub-
 missive in Taiwan. Although the government's policy and the economic en-
 vironment had not been supportive of agriculture, there were no instances of
 grievances presented by farmers in an organized fashion during the martial
 law era.
 Domestic Bargaining Prior to 1988
 When the U.S. pressured Taiwan to open its agricultural market in the mid-
 1980s, farmers and their organizations were clearly underrepresented in the
 agricultural policymaking processes. Some legislators voiced their concerns
 and spoke for farmers during the interpellation sessions but there was no
 systematic or consistent effort to make it a high-priority issue. Domestic bar-
 gaining occurred primarily at the elite level among bureaucratic agencies in
 Taiwan's Executive Yuan. This cross-departmental coordination was usually
 achieved within the framework of a special Task Force on Taiwan-U.S. Trade
 Relations. Before each round of negotiations with the U.S., the cabinet-level
 Task Force functioned as a forum for ranking officials from different Minis-
 tries such as Finance (MOF), Economic Affairs (MOEA), and Foreign Affairs
 (MOFA) to exchange views, coordinate policy differences, and finalize strat-
 egies.
 According to the 1973 Statute of Agricultural Development, the Council of
 Agriculture (COA) assumes responsibility for protecting agricultural interests
 and should be consulted concerning all agricultural imports. Within the Task
 Force, the COA had been conservative in granting tariff reductions and mar-
 ket openings. Initially, the consensus in the Task Force was to treat each
 negotiation as a zero-sum game and fight hard on every issue to minimize
 concessions. This approach served the COA well and gave it leeway to re-
 spond to U.S. demands with slow, piecemeal concessions.
 However, U.S. pressure intensified in 1986 when Taiwan went head-to-
 head with the U.S. in an economic showdown over the case of the beer, wine,
 and cigarettes negotiations. In October 1986, after months of unsuccessful
 negotiations, the American government initiated sanctions against Taiwan
 9. Liao Cheng-hong and Huang Chun-chieh, Zhanhou Taiwan nongoiin jiazhi quxiang de
 zhuanbian [The change of the value orientations for Taiwanese farmers after WW II] (Taipei:
 Lianjing, 1992), p. 124.
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 under Section 301 of the Trade Act for its delay in lifting restrictions on the
 sale of the aforementioned products and selected some of Taiwan's export
 industries as targets for retaliation. The incident was caused in part by the
 perceived uncompromising attitude of Taiwan's chief negotiator, who repre-
 sented the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Board, and a trade war was
 averted only by an eleventh-hour, back-channel deal. The strong, negative
 reaction from the U.S. on this issue was quite a shock for the Taiwan authori-
 ties; since then, Taiwan has preferred to steer away from this kind of
 brinksmanship as much as possible.
 Consequently, to avoid unnecessary delays and foot-dragging in trade ne-
 gotiations with the U.S., the modus vivendi in the Task Force has since been
 to see all issues on the agenda as a total package and rank them in implicit
 priority so that some might be sacrificed to protect others. The patterns indi-
 cated that the Taiwanese government favored tariff concessions to market
 openings, and the service sectors over agriculture.10 Since then, the COA has
 faced greater internal pressures from MOEA and MOFA; both preferred to
 maintain an amicable relationship with the U.S., Taiwan's largest export mar-
 ket and its most important political supporter.
 For economic and diplomatic officials, making concessions on agricultural
 issues was simply to follow the path of least resistance. The political risk
 was considered limited, given the traditional obedience and acquiescence of
 farmers and their groups; also, the adjustments were less disruptive given the
 diminishing role of agriculture in Taiwan's economy. In the early 1980s,
 Taiwan's agricultural sector grew at a meager 2%, in contrast with a near 5%
 growth in the 1970s. Agriculture accounted for less than 10% of the GDP
 and less than 19% of total employment (compared to 30% and 51%, respec-
 tively, in the early 1960s). Only 9% of the farming population remained full-
 time, with part-time farming households soaring to a record-level of 91%.
 For the efficiency-oriented, cost-conscious economic officials in the Task
 Force, reducing the level of agricultural protectionism was a logical step.
 In response to pressure from the U.S., Taiwan reduced tariffs for over 100
 agricultural products between 1985 and 1987 and eliminated many import
 restrictions; most concessions were made in the areas of fruit (fresh or
 canned) and meat (beef, fish, and turkey). Incidentally, as the Taiwanese
 economy continued to grow and personal incomes continued to rise, people
 reduced their consumption of rice while spending more money on more ex-
 pensive products such as meats, vegetables, and fruits. Trade liberalization in
 these areas thus gave foreign competitors a golden opportunity to push into
 10. See Robert E. Baldwin and Tian-Jy Chen, Political Economy of U.S. -Taiwan T-rade (East
 Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), pp. 96-97.
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 Taiwan's market. The enormous surge in agricultural imports quickly led to
 price meltdown, causing many local farmers to suffer greatly as a result.
 Farmers' Protests and Subsequent
 Developments
 Even though subsidy and support programs in the early 1970s had given
 farmers a much needed breather, they failed to change the fundamentals.
 Critics pointed out that just 3% of total public investment went to agriculture
 in the late 1980s, although the sector accounted for 5% of the GNP at the
 time."1 Government control and manipulation of commodity and fertilizer
 markets took away farmers' profit margins; in fact, farmers' average income
 was the lowest among all occupations, accounting for only 66A4% of that of
 nonfarmers.12 As Taiwan's industries expanded, many farmers found them-
 selves in conflict with nearby factories, which diverted irrigation systems,
 polluted water and soil, and lured away farm laborers. More and more young
 people left farming for what they saw as better lives and opportunities else-
 where. Since 1985, the rural population over the age of 65 has risen from
 111,000 to over 200,000, which puts the inefficient and nonprofitable farm-
 ing industry into a vicious cycle. The aging agrarian workforce did not re-
 ceive proper medical care, since farmers were the only group not covered by
 the national health insurance scheme.13 Thus, farmers in Taiwan had to
 struggle to survive the economic hardships of the 1980s.
 Government concessions in international agricultural negotiations made
 the situation even more difficult for farmers. Many felt that the government's
 trade policy further confirmed its traditional pro-industry bias. It was the
 industrial sector that had caused the problem of trade imbalance between Tai-
 wan and the U.S., but the agricultural sector was being singled out as the
 export sector's sacrificial lamb. The deep sense of frustration and betrayal,
 coming at a time when Taiwan's governing political authority was loosening
 its hold of the reins of power, burst into three huge demonstrations in the
 space of six months. In December 1987, more than 3,000 fruit farmers went
 to the Legislative Yuan to protest the plunge in fruit prices caused by im-
 ports. The following March, an estimated 4,000 farmers with diverse back-
 grounds (including rice farmers and chicken, hog, fruit, and tobacco growers)
 held a massive street demonstration in Taipei in advance of the coming round
 of U.S.-Taiwan negotiations in April. They were joined by such sympathiz-
 11. Zili zaobao [Independence morning post], April 27, 1991, p. 5.
 12. Zhonnguo shibao [China times], December 16, 1993, p. 6.
 13. Workers and civil servants have been covered by government-sponsored health insurance
 programs since 1950 and 1958, respectively. After much debate and delay, the farmers' health
 insurance was put on a trial basis in 1985 in 41 towns and villages. But, due to concerns about
 budgetary costs, the government was reluctant to extend coverage to others.
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 ers as college students, environmental groups, social activists, and members
 from two opposition parties, the Labor Party and Democratic Progressive
 Party (DPP). The protests drew strong sympathy from across the country but
 produced no concrete results from the government. More people were mobil-
 ized in response, and the protests and demonstrations culminated in a mas-
 sive, 5,000-farmer street rally in Taipei on May 20. By that time, the focus of
 the farmers' protest had expanded from import policies to a seven-point prop-
 osition seeking fundamental changes in government agricultural programs
 and policies.14 But the street action turned violent and became Taiwan's
 bloodiest incident in over 40 years as the demonstrators and their sympathiz-
 ers clashed with riot police in the streets. Over 100 people were arrested and
 many were subsequently sent to prison.
 Did the protests make a difference? Did farmers and their organizations
 enhance their power and position in domestic decision making? Was there
 any change in agricultural policy as a result of the protests? The irony of
 these short-lived political actions was that the farmers probably won the bat-
 tle but lost the war. The outburst of anger and frustration pushed various
 agricultural issues to the forefront. They forced the government to take im-
 mediate action on some programs that had been delayed for years, but it
 undertook no significant policy reversal nor made any concessions. In fact,
 the 1990 decision to apply for GATT/WTO membership indicated that the
 government was willing to pay the price of trade liberalization and market
 opening in its pursuit of international recognition, despite the potential fallout
 for the agricultural sector. Furthermore, under the 1990 Integrated Agricul-
 tural Adjustment Plan (IAAP) proposal that served as the agricultural pro-
 gram in the Six-Year National Development Plan (1991-97), the Executive
 Yuan set agriculture to a 0% growth rate. It also proposed to transform Tai-
 wan's agricultural sector from a protected, traditional industry to a technol-
 ogy-oriented, market-driven sector operating in an open, liberalized environ-
 ment. The IAAP's aim was to treat agriculture as a normal economic sector
 with no special state protection; to stay competitive in the liberal market or-
 der, farmers were forced to streamline production and enhance quality and
 productivity.
 Apparently, the spirited opposition from farmers failed to sway govern-
 ment trade and agricultural policies. The government's confidence in con-
 fronting farmers and discounting their seemingly vigorous campaigns derived
 from keen observation of the problems underlying the farmers' movement
 14. The demands included: extending the health insurance program to all farmers; removing
 government taxes and intervention in the fertilizer market; enhancing the purchase price for rice;
 changing the election processes for general managers in farmers' associations and presidents in
 irrigation associations; lifting the ban on farmland sales; and the establishment of a Ministry of
 Agriculture.
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 and skillful manipulation of these weaknesses. Problems were most evident
 in three areas.
 First, in 1988, as inexperienced protesters tried to build their own mobili-
 zation networks and bypass the existing KMT-controlled farmers' associa-
 tions, outside political groups provided much-needed logistical and organiza-
 tional support. The efficiency and effectiveness needed to organize several
 mass rallies within a six-month period were clearly beyond the skills of ordi-
 nary farmers, and would not have been possible without assistance from other
 political entrepreneurs. Between 1987 and 1988, three major groups took
 part in farmers' political movements: local politicians (mostly from the DPP),
 college students and intellectuals, and professional social activists, all with
 different motives and political objectives. These outside groups brought in
 their own political agenda along with their expertise when they joined the
 farmers' campaigns. At that time, most were in the periphery, rather than at
 the center, of political action. By involving themselves in agricultural issues,
 these political entrepreneurs sought to expand their own power bases and
 gain grassroots support for their own causes in the post-martial law era in
 Taiwan.
 The convergence of these diverse forces in 1988 quickly transformed the
 nature of farmers' actions from anti-policy protest to anti-state protest, for
 the latter was the common denominator among the different forces. As the
 tenor of the grievances was escalated and directed toward the state, the origi-
 nal goal of farmers' movements became increasingly politicized. A show-
 down with the police-a symbol of the state-became almost inevitable by
 May 1988. But after the bloody showdown, many farmers at the grassroots
 level were either appalled by the violence or feared further government
 roundups. Either way, they became disillusioned with the new political tac-
 tics and by what they might accomplish. The protests would also prove to
 have a more long-term effect. Statistics in subsequent years showed that ag-
 ricultural imports in the most contentious areas, fruit and turkeys, were not as
 damaging as farmers first thought. The perception that the farmers had over-
 reacted limited the appeal of their cause for the public. As the legitimacy and
 credibility of the movements were cast in doubt, farmers lost ground in their
 campaign for change.
 Following the May 1988 incident, many political entrepreneurs after hav-
 ing gained name recognition moved on to pursue their political careers in
 provincial and national levels through opportunities opened up by the lifting
 of martial law. But the unorganized and underfunded farmers did not shift
 their battlegrounds from the streets to the newly empowered Legislative
 Yuan. In the absence of effective and extensive lobbying, though agricultural
 issues and farmers' problems have received strong verbal support from legis-
 lators, that support has never materialized into concrete plans or action. Evi-
This content downloaded from 130.218.13.44 on Wed, 21 Sep 2016 12:52:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 CHIEN-PIN LI 595
 dently, farmers remained hamstrung by their traditional weaknesses in
 forming political organizations in the post-martial law area. The attempt to
 evade the KMT-controlled farmers' associations ironically made farmers the
 captives of other political interests, and might have contributed to the radical-
 ism and violence of 1988 that further alienated those who had not gotten
 involved.
 The farmers' second problem was that their weakness in creating political
 organizations was aggravated further by internal division, a result of eco-
 nomic diversification in the farming profession. In the 1960s, rice was the
 dominant crop in Taiwan, accounting for 40% of the agricultural production
 value. Since then, its economic significance has diminished substantially.
 By the late 1980s, lice (17%) trailed well behind the fastest growing sectors,
 livestock (40%) and fruit/vegetables (28%), in the share of production
 value.'5 As a consequence, Taiwan's farmers had come to comprise two sub-
 groups: traditional rice farmers and emerging fruit and livestock farmers.
 Though rice farmers accounted for the majority of farmers in Taiwan, most
 were engaged in agriculture only part-time. Generally, they were older,
 under-educated, and politically passive and conservative. Fruit and livestock
 farmers, on the other hand, were younger, better educated, and closer to the
 image of capitalist entrepreneurs than that of being provincial farmers. They
 were more informed about the market and were quite sensitive to price fluc-
 tuations because of the significant amount of investment and risk involved in
 their farming operations. Although they constituted a smaller share of farm-
 ing households, they were politically active and very vocal about their griev-
 ances. In fact, they initiated and participated in most of the protests and
 demonstrations of the 1980s.
 The two groups shared in both their discontent with government agricul-
 tural policies and the desire to improve their economic fortunes. However,
 they had different attitudes toward farming and farmland policy. Rice farm-
 ers, who saw rice farming as unprofitable but realized that the land they
 owned might be worth a fortune if sold for commercial or industrial use,
 wanted to leave farming altogether. They insisted that the government ease
 restrictions on farmland transactions. But fruit farmers, who grew tropical
 and subtropical fruit along mountain slopes, and livestock farmers, who in-
 vested large amounts of money in building hog or chicken farms, were inter-
 ested in creating a more favorable "business" environment. The differences
 in their concerns and approaches led to an internal division in the farmers'
 protests.
 15. Sophia Wu Huang, "Structural Change in Taiwan's Agricultural Economy," Economnic
 Development and Cultural Change, 42:1 (1993), pp. 44-47.
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 Fruit and livestock farmers' concerns about U.S. imports made them a nat-
 ural ally of left-wing intellectuals endorsing anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist
 ideologies. Rice farmers, who suffered from the KMT's agricultural policy,
 gravitated toward local DDP activists. Interventions by these political forces
 further reinforced the cleavages. In the wake of May 1988, fruit farmers
 formed the Farmers' Alliance and rice farmers the Taiwan Farmers' Rights
 Association. But neither have made significant inroads in the KMT's rural
 strongholds, as can be seen by the poor performances of the candidates they
 supported in subsequent elections.
 Finally, farmers' movements suffered from ill-defined goals and expecta-
 tions. The movements' lack of accomplishment was in part due to not having
 a clear vision about goals. An analysis of the banners, posters, and slogans
 used throughout the demonstrations leaves one with the impression that most
 of the fanners were still conditioned by their traditional state-dependent
 mentality. By expressing their misfortune and distress with metaphors of
 death, slavery, and injustice, farmers essentially made emotional appeals,
 hoping that government would fulfill its moral obligations as a caretaker for
 the farmers. The mentality underlying this approach viewed the state as an
 enlightened, benevolent leader-an authority that would grant them mercy
 and favor.
 Nevertheless, for decades, it was believed that troubles in Taiwan's agri-
 culture began with government intervention. The KMT's firm grip on agrar-
 ian politics and government manipulation of policy factors made Taiwanese
 agriculture essentially a subordinate sector with only an instrumental value in
 supporting the government's other "more worthy" goals: first industrializa-
 tion in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by managing diplomatic relations' with
 the U.S. in the 1980s. Politico-economic objectives were often pursued at the
 expense of farmers. Given an interventionist government that has tradition-
 ally ignored farmers, were the farmers realistic in trusting the government for
 "benign intervention?"
 Some farmers believed that they must limit the government's role in agri-
 culture to regain economic autonomy and independence, while others pre-
 ferred to see a state actively fulfilling its moral duty. The seven requests
 made by farmers in May 1988 reflected this mix. Some called for less state
 intervention (e.g., in farmland sales, fertilizer markets, and elections of farm-
 ers' organizations), while others sought the exact opposite (e.g., in the rice
 purchase program, the farmers' health insurance program, and the enhance-
 ment of the COA's status). Conflicting expectations over the state's role
 raised a fundamental question about the ultimate goal of the protests: would
 farmers be satisfied with small favors and instant gratification from the gov-
 ernment, or would they continue to look for major political engineering and
 structural overhaul to reclaim their independence in economic initiatives?
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 The legacy of the farmers' traditional political culture probably made one
 choice more obvious and attractive than the other, but it also limited the
 breadth and depth of their political influence.
 As discussed below, the government subsequently responded to farmers
 with small favors of various forms but conceded nothing on fundamental is-
 sues. The decisions to join GATT/WTO, the pursuit of the IAAP, and the
 plan to scale down agricultural employment to 3% in 10 years by moving an
 estimated 700,000 or 800,000 farmers out of the farming sector,'6 indicated
 that the government was determined to pursue agricultural retrenchment, or a
 de-farming policy. Contrary to farmers' wishes, moral obligation gave way
 to principles of economic efficiency and cost effectiveness. Agriculture's an-
 cillary position in the economy was cemented despite the protests.
 Domestic Bargaining after 1988
 The farmers' demonstrations did change the government's position of "in-
 terventionist negligence," at least for the short run. The anger and frustration
 displayed made it impossible for the state to implement further retrenchment
 simply by decree; hence, a repertory of tactics was used to appease farmers
 while allowing the government to continue its de-farming practices.
 Side-payments
 First, to ease the tension, the government resorted to the tactic of making
 side-payments. As a form of direct or indirect compensation, the side-pay-
 ment is often explained as being a measure to alleviate grievances. Several
 measures that could be conceived as side-payments were adopted shortly af-
 ter the farmers' protests; some were in answer to the seven propositions made
 in May 1988.
 In July 1988, then-Taiwan Provincial Governor Chiu Chuang-huan an-
 nounced that, beginning in October 1988, the government would provide a
 comprehensive health program for all farmers. It would be open to all mem-
 bers of the farmers' associations. The members would pay 40% of the pre-
 miums, the government 50%, and the farmers' associations themselves the
 remaining 10%. Twenty-five years had passed since the issue was first raised
 in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly in 1963. The farmers' anger indeed has-
 tened the change. However, the program ran a deficit from day one, with the
 old age of the farmers and lax conditions on eligibility being primary contrib-
 uting factors. By 1993, although the number of farmers was estimated at 1
 million, 1.6 million people had joined the insurance program. The program's
 16. It was suggested by Vincent Siew, chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and
 Development. See Lianhe bao [United daily], June 28, 1994, p. 2.
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 accumulated deficit soared to NT$ 35 billion.17 The Executive Yuan decided
 not to adjust the premiums for fear of antagonizing farmers and paid for the
 shortfall.
 In 1989 the Executive Yuan, responding to pressures from the first popu-
 larly elected Legislative Yuan, approved a plan in 1992 to increase the
 amount of rice purchased by 20% and increase the purchase price as well. It
 was estimated that additional NT$ 1.5 billion was needed to implement the
 project. Additionally, the government phased out irrigation fees and has fully
 subsidized the cost since fiscal 1994. Prices for fertilizers were frozen after
 the 1988 protests. Although the state-operated Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation
 requested a modest 6.7% price increase in 1993 due to soaring production
 costs, the MOEA postponed the price hike under pressure from the Legisla-
 tive Yuan.
 In December 1988, the COA had announced that farmers suffering losses
 due to agricultural imports would qualify for import relief. New legislation
 was drafted and submitted to the cabinet. Cash payments and other kinds of
 assistance were parts of the compensation program. In 1993 the government
 proposed to appropriate NT$ 1 billion in a six-year renovation project for
 some rural villages. Forty so-called fuli (prosperous and beautiful) villages
 were initially selected for this program, which would modernize their infra-
 structures and recreation facilities to narrow the gap between urban and rural
 areas.
 However, despite these programs, it is clear that the "generosity" of the
 Executive Yuan had its limits. Not all projects earned its blessing. For in-
 stance, the crop insurance programs and direct payments intended to provide
 additional benefits to farmers that were proposed by the COA in 1991 stalled
 in the Executive Yuan due to their potential costs. It appeared that the gov-
 ernment was trying to placate farmers with minimal, selective concessions.
 This strategy can be seen most clearly in the policy making process surround-
 ing the monthly stipend for the elderly farmers. The idea was first proposed
 as a retirement stipend for farmers in 1990 and a task force was formed to
 study the issue. But in the next three years, it met only twice. In October
 1993, months after another symbolic rally by farmers commemorating the
 fifth anniversary of the 1988 demonstration, both President Lee Teng Hui and
 Premier Lien Chen indicated that the administration would propose legisla-
 tion by the end of the year. However, the deadline came and went. In Au-
 gust 1994, the government announced that, due to the potential cost and
 burden on the budget, it would have to abandon the idea.
 17. It was estimated that there were only 1 million farmers. Taiwaln ribao [Taiwan daily],
 January 28, 1993, p. 2.
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 After much debate and pressure from some members of the Legislative
 Yuan, as a compromise the Executive Yuan proposed to provide a monthly
 stipend only for elderly farmers in need. This governmental bill, supported
 by the KMT, would have limited significantly the number of qualified farm-
 ers and hence the expenditures. During legislative deliberations, the opposi-
 tion parties (the DPP and the New Party) together with some KMT defectors
 representing the rural interests suggested that the stipend be given to all farm-
 ers regardless of need. The KMT vehemently opposed this idea. In May
 1995, the coalition nonetheless successfully out-maneuvered the KMT in the
 legislative battle to eliminate most restrictions on the eligibility for stipends.
 The Executive Yuan initially raised the stakes and asked for a legislative
 review of the issue, but in the end it acquiesced and reluctantly agreed. As a
 result, an estimated NT$ 20 billion was added to the yearly cost of the pro-
 gram.
 The use of these side-payments evidently represented the Executive
 Yuan's response to the farmers' call for the government to fulfill its moral
 obligations. However, to project a loving and caring image through monetary
 compensations puts an extra burden on the government budget. Therefore, in
 an attempt to minimize these financial burdens while maintaining its respon-
 sive image, the Taiwan government explored another less expensive option-
 pursuing ideas with an appearance of integrative arrangement.
 Integrative Arrangement
 The idea behind integrative arrangement is to integrate opposing needs and
 demands by creating innovative agreements that can satisfy both sides. As a
 means of obtaining joint benefits from divergent positions, integrative ar-
 rangements attempt to bridge differences and promote common interests for
 everyone involved. In the case of Taiwan, some agricultural policies might,
 on the surface, appear to benefit both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors;
 however, close analysis shows the distribution of benefits to be either limited
 for, or skewed against, farmers.
 Farmland release. After the land reform, severe restrictions were put on
 farmland transactions. Farmland must be transferred between farmers and
 used for agricultural purposes; it cannot be diverted to other uses. As of
 1995, farmland accounted for 24.3% of the total land in Taiwan; that zoned
 for industrial, commercial, and residential use occupied only 7.6% in total.
 The farmland share is much higher than that of many other Asian economies
 such as Hong Kong (15%), Malaysia (14.9%), and Indonesia (17%).18 Re-
 18. Zhongguo shibao [China times], April 5, 1997, p. 11.
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 strictions have made industrial and commercial land quite expensive in Tai-
 wan.
 To circumvent the ban, it was reported that many financial interests had
 already obtained deeds to valuable farmland close to urban areas by taking
 advantage of existing legal loopholes. After establishing control, they pushed
 for rezoning and converted the land to nonfarm use, which resulted in huge
 profits. Farmers who sold land became rich overnight. Such stories have
 encouraged many farmers to believe that they are sitting on gold mines and
 so they are more than willing to cash in on their fortunes by selling the land.
 As a consequence, a push for change in the laws governing sales of farmland
 was made a top priority in the farmers' movements in 1988, especially for
 rice farmers.
 After much deliberation and debate, on July 27, 1995, the Executive Yuan
 approved the Farmland Release Program to ease restrictions on farmland re-
 zoning. Under this program, a total of 160,000 hectares of land that was
 polluted, low-producing, or in coastal subsidence areas was targeted for re-
 lease to nonfarm use. By lifting or easing the restrictions, the government
 sought not only to appease farmers but to serve industrial and commercial
 interests as well. Although this was seen as a farmer's dream come true, it is
 doubtful that many will benefit from it. The high land prices were originally
 caused by tight control of supply. By lifting the controls, the increased sup-
 ply of land might actually depress land values and potential profits for farm-
 ers. In addition, the proposed windfall tax on huge profits, allegedly
 designed to cut down potential profits for big financial groups, could also
 take away capital gains from ordinary farmers.
 The measure's real beneficiary could be commercial or industrial interests,
 who can obtain land at much lower prices. Builders and developers are less
 interested in farmlands released from the program since they are generally far
 from other living or commercial facilities; their prime targets are the quality
 farmland at the periphery of the cities. Consequently, they continue to push
 for total release and free transaction of all farmland. If they succeed, it could
 lead to further de-farming of Taiwan.
 Farmer migration. To effectively reduce the number of farmers in Taiwan,
 the COA in the early 1990s proposed encouraging farmers to emigrate to
 other countries. At various times, the destinations proposed included the for-
 mer Soviet Union, mainland China, and other Southeast Asian countries.
 Modeling its earlier strategy on the "agricultural diplomacy" that sent techni-
 cal missions to many poor African states in the 1960s and 1970s in exchange
 for diplomatic support of Taiwan, the Taiwanese government resorted to
 these tactics again for a variety of reasons. First of all, it was hoped that it
 could deal effectively with, if not eliminate totally, the agricultural sector's
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 problems by significantly reducing the number of farmers in Taiwan. Migra-
 tion would resolve these problems much more quickly than aging or retire-
 ment. After migration, the government could easily readjust the amount of
 resources spent on the agricultural sector. Additionally, the government
 hoped migration would accomplish other diplomatic and strategic goals. The
 former Soviet Union, South America, and Southeast Asia were mentioned
 because of their strategic importance to Taiwan, as Taiwan attempted to con-
 solidate diplomatic ties in those areas. It was believed that the agricultural
 assistance programs put in place in these countries will result in paybacks
 later in the political arena.
 However, encouraging farmers to emigrate is quite different from sending
 technical assistance overseas. It is clear that most of the older farmers would
 not be interested in uprooting and moving overseas, while language and cul-
 tural barriers might deter most of the undereducated ones. The only potential
 candidates who might be interested in the idea, and have the capital and ex-
 pertise to follow through, are large corporate farmers and state enterprises
 like Taiwan Sugar Co. The idea had only limited appeal.
 Ironically, there were also unexpected policy backlashes when farmers in-
 vested in mainland China, a place with similar language and cultural back-
 grounds. Fujian Province has attracted over US$1 billion in agricultural
 investments from Taiwan in the areas of vegetables, black mushrooms, and
 fruit. Farmers on the mainland quickly learned and copied the agricultural
 know-how offered by Taiwanese farmers and easily moved into cutthroat
 competition with Taiwanese investors in both the mainland and overseas
 markets. Additionally, the commodities put more pressure on Taiwanese
 farmers when exported to Taiwan, given the cost advantages on the mainland.
 Nevertheless, from another perspective, it could be argued that by using
 the opportunity to import agricultural products from mainland China, the
 Taiwanese government could accomplish several goals at once. First, it
 would expedite de-farming by pushing "inefficient" farmers out of the market
 through competition. However, since many agricultural products from China
 were banned officially in Taiwan and smuggled in, it is the smugglers, not the
 government, on whom the blame would fall. On the other hand, cheap im-
 ports from the mainland could ease inflationary pressure as Taiwan reduces
 its farms and farmlands. The soundness of the de-famling policy will not be
 challenged seriously so long as consumers do not feel the pain of rising prices
 or food shortages.
 Recreational agriculture. To preserve the farmers' livelihood and the farm-
 ing environment and promote appreciation of pastoral experiences in an in-
 creasingly industrialized society, the government promoted the notion of
 recreational agriculture, or agri-tourism. Farmers could open their farms to
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 city dwellers by converting them to "pick-your-own fruit farms" or "week-
 end-getaway farm houses." In this way, agricultural production was com-
 bined with recreation and education, and farmers benefited from the
 additional revenue to supplement their income. The COA began to promote
 this idea in the 1980s, and with the cooperation of some local farmers' as-
 sociations agri-tourism is becoming increasingly popular. An estimated 70
 pick-your-own farms are now in the vicinity of Taipei City.
 However, critics argue that such models might not be feasible for every-
 one.19 To make a farm attractive enough for recreational agriculture, sea-
 sonal fruits must be grown year-round; this requires a large-scale operation
 and huge start-up capital. Otherwise, small-size farms can generate only lim-
 ited profits. At most, agri-tourism can only be used as a sideline business; it
 is definitely not a practical solution to the fundamental problems in agricul-
 ture.
 Conclusion
 In Taiwan, the lifting of agricultural protectionism was forced upon the coun-
 try by external pressures from foreign governments at a time of internal de-
 mocratization. Cross-cutting pressures from within and without presented a
 dilemma for the government and limited its ability to maneuver. Domesti-
 cally, the government ran into stiff resistance as farmers organized massive
 demonstrations in an attempt to keep their markets protected and subsidies
 intact.
 However, the farmers' protests had problems. Weaknesses in organization
 and lobbying, conservative attitudes, and internal divisions all failed to sus-
 tain the momentum in their movements. Most importantly, by taking advan-
 tage of some of these problems, the Taiwanese government skillfully used
 side-payments and proposed integrative arrangements to defuse the pressure.
 In the end, very few concessions were made, while the government moved
 closer to its goal of retrenchment and de-farming. It might have been inevita-
 ble to see a shrinking and diminishing of the agricultural sector's role in a
 fast-growing industrial and service-based economy, but the course taken to
 get there politically was not a straight one.
 19. Kelly Her, "Agricultural Amateurs," Free China Review 47:10 (October 1997), p. 31.
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